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VISUAL JURISPRUDENCE
By images I mean shadows . . . Plato1
[T]he aura is bound to [the living person’s] presence in the here and now. 
There is no facsimile of the aura. Walter Benjamin2
[E]very epoch is defined by its own practices of knowledge and strategies 
of power, which are composed from regimes of visibility and procedures of 
expression. David Rodowick3
I. INTRODUCTION
 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment expresses a preference for 
actuality. That is why, in a criminal case, the courts say, when it comes to a defendant’s 
right to confront the witnesses against him, only a compelling countervailing interest 
will suffice to warrant something less than a live, face-to-face encounter in court.4 
When it comes to testing the claims of visual images more generally inside the 
courtroom, actuality remains the touchstone as well. The law’s custodial responsibility 
for truth-based justice persists on screen and off. But how do we know, when screens 
turn on, whether or to what extent reality prevails?5 That uncertainty, particularly in 
the age of digital editing and digital simulation, generates an urgent need to 
intelligently confront the power and limitations of visual images inside the courtroom. 
Lawyers, judges, and jurors today need training in visual literacy. That is what the 
theory and practice of visual jurisprudence aim to provide.
 This, then, is the case for visual prudence in the law. It announces the emergence 
of visual jurisprudence as a robust, interdisciplinary training ground for specific 
competencies pertinent to the visual digital age in which we live. Today, lawyers, 
judges, and jurors face a vast array of visual evidence and visual argument. From 
videos documenting crimes and accidents to computer displays of their digital 
simulation, increasingly, the search for fact-based justice inside the courtroom is 
becoming an offshoot of visual meaning making. But when law migrates to the 
1. Plato, The Republic VI, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato 745 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington 
Cairns eds., 2002).
2. Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproduction, in Selected Writings, 
1938-1940, at 260 (Howard Eiland & Michael W. Jennings eds., 2003).
3. D.N. Rodowick, Reading the Figural, Or, Philosophy After the New Media, at xi (2001).
4. The classic reference here is Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause 
guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”). See 
also United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 1998) (referring to the 
use of video conferences in lieu of live testimony in court: “[T]he demands of efficiency, and even 
necessity, do not create automatic exceptions to Constitutional requirements.”).
5. See, e.g., Errol Morris’s path breaking, and case altering, film—billed as a documentary, but hardly 
that—The Thin Blue Line (American Playhouse 1988). See generally Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: 
Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 39, 47 (1994); Richard K. 
Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line between Law and Popular Culture 
(2000) [hereinafter Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop].
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screen it lives there as other images do, motivating belief and judgment on the basis 
of visual delight and unconscious fantasies and desires as well as actualities. Law as 
image also shares broader cultural anxieties concerning not only the truth of the 
image, but also the mimetic capacity itself, the human ability to represent reality. 
What is real, and what is simulation? This is the hallmark of the baroque, when 
dreams fold into dreams, or should we say the digital baroque, when images on the 
screen immerse us in a seemingly endless matrix of digital appearances.6
 As with the baroque in art or music, the digital baroque in law is characterized by 
saturation of detail and hyper-ornamentation. Perhaps it will come in the form of 
shimmering colors of a functional magnetic resonance image purporting to show 
abnormalities in a criminal defendant’s brain. Or perhaps it will be a digital simulation 
of a murder scene, as occurred in the Amanda Knox trial in Italy. In his closing 
argument at that trial, Perugian prosecutor Giuliano Mignini played a computer-
generated simulation that showed an avatar-Amanda Knox killing an avatar-Meredith 
Kercher. It ended with a gory crime-scene photo of Kercher’s body. But was this simply 
a fantasy—an animated version of the prosecution’s theory featuring Amanda Knox as 
a sex-crazed femme fatale, “Foxy Knoxy,” as the British tabloids called her, a “she-
devil,” as many European journalists wrote, appropriating the prosecutor’s phrase?7
 Effective prosecutors and defense lawyers often mine the popular imagination for 
well-known characters (“she-devil,”  “femme fatale”)  and stock scripts (“sex game 
gone wrong”) to help frame their story in court. Once a narrative frame is set, so, too, 
is the belief system that it embodies. Within that belief system, dissonant details get 
pushed away, while consonant ones leap to an observer’s attention. This is important 
to trial lawyers because there are always gaps in the evidence. It is difficult to 
reconstruct past events. But with a recognizable story frame and a cast of familiar 
characters in hand, advocates can coax their audience (jurors and judges alike) to fill 
in missing details. “This is how that kind of story goes.” “That is how this kind of 
person behaves.” The audience’s experience of the world helps to put f lesh on the 
bare bones of a prosecutor’s or defense attorney’s legal theory.8
 The battle inside the courtroom over competing storylines plays out even more 
powerfully on the screen than it does in print. In an age of smartphones and 
ubiquitous surveillance cameras, events that once would have gone unrecorded are 
preserved for posterity and, inevitably, for trial. At the same time, digital graphics 
and animations take decision makers anywhere and everywhere—into the body in 
medical malpractice cases, inside complex machinery in patent-infringement cases, 
or on the scene as a virtual eyewitness to murder in a criminal case. Videos and 
6. See Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques & 
Entanglements (2011) [hereinafter Sherwin, Visualizing Law].
7. See Richard K. Sherwin, The Digital Trial, Project Syndicate (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-digital-trial.
8. See Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, supra note 5; see also Anthony Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, 
Minding the Law (2001).
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animations are powerful tools in the search for fact-based justice.9 But they also 
create new stumbling blocks. As viewers, we may think we are getting the whole 
picture, but every camera frames its own point of view. With equal certainty we may 
believe in the digital images that we see, but how can we be sure of their basis in 
reality? Once we enter the domain of digital simulation, how do we keep from 
slipping into an endless matrix of mere appearances?
 The proliferation of electronic visual media has transformed social and cultural 
practices of meaning making around the world. In all walks of life, the life of law 
included, visual images increasingly compete with words alone. The visuals shown in 
court are wide ranging. And so, too, are the aesthetic cues through which they coax 
viewers into states of belief or skepticism. That is why we need to incorporate new 
visual benchmarks into the rhetoric of law. New critical standards are needed to help 
jurists cope with the epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical quandaries that 
accompany law’s migration to the screen.
 Shifting to an audio-visual register in the rhetoric of law with our justice system’s 
credibility intact requires broad cultivation of a more refined capacity for critical 
visual judgment. At the same time, it also requires new forms of visual eloquence. 
Consider, for a moment, the various ways in which visual communication differs 
from communicating in words alone. Of particular interest in this regard is the 
peculiar efficacy of visual representation. What explains its singular power? For one 
thing, visual representations do not simply resemble reality, they also tend to 
stimulate the same cognitive and especially emotional responses that are aroused by 
the reality they depict. Movies, television, and photographs, among other image-
based media, tend to overpower mere words (though words also undoubtedly help to 
shape the way images are construed, as varying the caption to identical photographs 
will amply show). The power of visual images can be discerned in the way they 
effectively engulf the spectator (or, in the case of computer games and immersive 
virtual environments, the “interactive player”) in vivid, life-like sensations.
 Emotion enhances belief. To the extent that visual images amplify emotion 
beyond the usual efficacy of text, images tend to be more compelling than text alone. 
Viewers often treat visual images as if they were “windows” opening onto reality, 
rather than as the visual constructions that they are. As Richard Lanham put it, we 
tend to look at text, but we look through the electronic screen.10 Unlike words, which 
are abstract and obviously constructed, photographs, films, and video images seem to 
be caused by the external world. With no obvious trace of mediation, visual images 
seem to lack artifice. That is why visual images make for such highly persuasive 
evidence for what they purport to depict.11 Moreover, unlike words, even when 
images seek to make propositional claims some of their meaning always remains 
9. For numerous illustrations of various forms of visual lawyering, see Richard K. Sherwin, Visual 
Persuasion Project, http://www.nyls.edu/centers/projects/visual_persuasion (last visited June 17, 2012).
10. See Richard Lanham, The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (1995).
11. See Saul M. Kassim & Meghan A. Dunn, Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury: Facilitative and 
Prejudicial Effects, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 269 (1997). 
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implicit. Images cannot be reduced to explicit propositions.12 They always leave 
something behind, something unsaid—the irreducible visual remainder.
 In short, images do not merely add to words. They are transformative, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, which is to say, both in terms of the content that they 
display and the efficacy of emotion and belief that they evoke. Much of the power of 
the image derives from the way it performs its function—how we mind the image for 
meaning’s sake. Consider, for example, the nature of visual uptake. Unlike the 
sequential assimilation of verbal or textual messages, the meaning of images is often 
grasped all at once. It takes a lot less time and seeming effort to absorb a picture than 
to read a thousand words. Such rapid and comparatively easy intelligibility allows 
viewers to assimilate one visual meaning after another in quick succession. The 
immediacy of visual uptake also serves to enhance believability. We are so busy, and 
often so sensorially gratified taking in rapid f lows of visual information that the felt 
need to second-guess what we see hardly arises.
 Diminished critical judgment invites enhanced visual credulity. The fact that so 
much of what we glean from visual images remains unconscious feeds the 
disinclination to object (or to suspend belief). Visual communication operates largely 
on the basis of associative logic. In response to what we see on the screen, we 
unconsciously associate to memories, thoughts, and feelings. Investing images with 
personal feelings and associations strengthens the viewer’s sense of “ownership.” It is 
difficult to argue with something one has already experienced as true. By the same 
token, familiarity alone, the feeling of having encountered the same sort of visual 
image before in other works, or other genres in the culture at large, benefits from an 
already authorized sense of shared meaning. The pleasure of such recognition, like 
the sensory gratification of experiencing the image itself, augments the viewer’s 
feeling of immersion and, by extension, of the truthfulness of what appears.
 The way we mind the world and others around us changes along with significant 
changes in our tools of perception and mass communication. Over time, we become 
the tools we use. The camera is already inside our head, so to speak, along with the 
stream of digital programs and codes that we commonly use to recognize patterns on 
the screen before us. Like perception and technology, law and culture are intertwined. 
No longer may students of law remain preoccupied exclusively by the texts of the 
trade—whether judicial opinions, legislative codes, regulations, contracts, constitutions, 
or treaties. Law awakens from its dogmatic slumber upon contact with the flesh of the 
world, and the skin of the image. Facts have a tendency to carry abstract legal codes 
into the realm of real human drama. Facts spawn stories. And stories are not easily 
bred in captivity, much less in the lab. They are a part of our everyday lives, and they 
permeate the popular culture in which we live. In the stories that we hear and tell, 
popular culture speaks. Our sense of self is distributed by the stories that circulate 
around and through us.13 Those very stories cross over into law whenever human 
12. Paul Messaris, Visual Persuasion: The Role of Images in Advertising (1997).
13. Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning 69 (1990).
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conflicts crank up the law’s machinery of dispute avoidance and dispute resolution. 
Law without storytelling is like having rules without human conflict.
 Culture constitutes the collective repository and repertoire of legal storytelling. In a 
visual age such as our own, visual storytelling asserts its own measure of content, craft, and 
efficacy along with its own sense of expectation, interpretation, and critique. The world of 
law, as everywhere else in contemporary society, marches in lockstep with shared visual 
scripts and digital programs. In the previous century, Martin Heidegger said we dwell in 
language, “the house of Being.”14 But today, new rooms have been added on, together with 
the screens that glow within them. We increasingly inhabit a digital matrix of synthetic 
visual representations. It’s a little like living in the mirror—a special kind of mirror that has 
been algorithmically encoded to reflect back other rooms and other faces, some of which 
may or may not be our own. On this imaginary landscape of flattened signs we live out 
much of our private and public lives. The ensuing transformation in the meaning making 
process runs the gamut from entertainment, to commerce, to managing the affairs of state.15
 It is now commonplace in the realm of the human sciences that interpretations of 
truth and falsity are, to a significant extent, socially constructed and culturally 
contingent.16 Many disciplines, including the philosophy of science,17 the philosophy of 
language,18 and linguistics,19 recognize that meaning depends on context, and that truth 
depends on the ways in which it is represented. Indeed, new studies of the physiology of 
perception indicate that even our most basic contacts with reality are socially mediated 
and constructed.20 Scholars have sought to explain how knowledge is locally constructed 
through culturally embedded practices and through diverse techniques of investigation 
and representation.21 Likewise, in Anglo-American legal studies, many have recognized 
that legal meaning is produced by the ways law is practiced,22 and that rhetoric in its 
many guises is constitutive of, not opposed to, truth.23
14. See Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art Works 198 (1985) (“In thinking, Being 
comes to language. Language is the house of Being. Man dwells in this house, and the thinkers and the 
poets are the guardians of this house.”) (citing Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism).
15. See, e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, Wiki Government (2009).
16. See Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language (1981).
17. See Bruno Latour, Science in Action (1987); Bruno Latour, Laboratory Life: The Construction 
of Scientific Facts (1986).
18. See Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and 
Praxis (1983).
19. See Eve Sweetser, From Etymology of Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of 
Semantic Structure (1991).
20. Gregory Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental 
Rotation, 58 Biological Psychiatry 245, 245–53 (2005).
21. See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge 184 (3d ed. 1983); see also Richard Shweder, Thinking 
Through Cultures (1991).
22. See Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (1962).
23. See Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law 
of Confessions, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729 (1988); see also Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, supra note 5.
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 Nevertheless, the cultural shift from an objectivist to a constructivist approach to 
human knowledge has not been anxiety-free.24 Many participants in and observers of 
the legal system in particular continue to experience uneasiness with the semioticians’ 
wisdom that “it’s all signs.”25 Their fear seems to be that embracing this constructivist 
insight would undercut confidence in the capacity of legal proceedings 
(paradigmatically, trials) to yield provable truths about the world.26 An unbridgeable 
gap between what legal decision makers believe they need to know and what, on 
reflection, they seem able to know is for many a cause for real concern. Within this 
late modern (or postmodern) mindset, there is a heightened sense of inhabiting a 
universe of representations that seems to turn the urge for real world knowledge back 
upon itself, as if in an endless regression, like some spectacular baroque tapestry or 
infinite arabesque endlessly folding in upon itself.27
 This vertiginous sense of a lack of grounding has intensified in the digital 
baroque age in which we now live. Digital technologies allow the pictures and words 
from which meanings are composed to be seamlessly modified and recombined in 
any fashion whatsoever, while the Internet allows practically anyone, anywhere, to 
disseminate meanings just about everywhere. The Enlightenment-era insistence 
upon essentialist foundations (whether exemplified by Locke’s empiricism, Kant’s 
rational categories, or other totalizing epistemologies) is being challenged by digital 
experience, which has helped to inspire an alternative model of knowledge and reality 
as a centerless28 and constantly morphing network of relations.29
24. For example, as Bernstein notes, the shift from viewing reason from the standpoint of scientific 
“falsifiability” to an acknowledgement of inescapable historicity and situatedness prompts “Cartesian 
Anxiety” and the fear of relativism. Bernstein, supra note 18, at 36.
25. This sentiment was famously expressed in Geertz’s observation that law is “a distinctive manner of 
imagining the real,” Geertz, supra note 21, at 218, and by his memorable description of human being 
suspended in “webs of meaning they themselves have spun.” Clifford Geertz, Available Light 17 
(2000); see Richard K. Sherwin, Neal Feigenson & Christina Spiesel, Law in the Digital Age: How Visual 
Communication Technologies Are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & 
Tech. L. 227 (2006) [hereinafter Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age]; Thomas Sebeok, Signs: An 
Introduction to Semiotics (1994) (paraphrasing Max Weber).
26. See Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial (2001); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On 
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (1985).
27. See Sherwin, Visualizing Law, supra note 6.
28. Consider in this regard the pivotal scene in the Wachowski siblings’ film, when Neo learns his life is a 
fake. As Morpheus puts it: “The world as it was at the end of the twentieth century exists now only as part 
of a neural-interactive simulation that we call the Matrix. You’ve been living in a dream world, Neo.” The 
Matrix (Warner Bros. Pictures 2000). Baroque reality is reality as pure effect, without presence, or 
being, like a collective hallucination. See Vilem Flusser, The Shape of Things: A Philosophy of 
Design (1999); Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life (Anne Boyman trans., 2001); 
Gilles Deleuze, Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (Tom Conley trans., 1992).
29. Walter Benjamin associates this ontological and epistemological instability with baroque culture, which in 
his view stands like a tree whose roots have been excised. According to Benjamin, living in a baroque era 
is suffused with the feeling of being “driven along to a cataract.” Sherwin, Visualizing Law, supra note 
6, at 9 (quoting Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama 66 (1998)).
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 No walk of life, no matter how far flung or esoteric, is immune to the influence of 
contemporary visual culture. From aboriginal rituals30 to neuro-scientific studies31 to 
courtroom practices around the world,32 electronic screens increasingly mediate the 
realities in which we live and from which we seek meaning, understanding, and 
judgment. Aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and, yes, jurisprudence, are all 
being interpellated anew by new communication technologies. Everyone everywhere 
lives more and more of his or her life on the screen. It behooves us, therefore, to cultivate 
a proper understanding of the visual codes that are operating in the meaning-making 
process. To be sure, the stakes involved in undertaking this task are greatest when it 
comes to law, for that is where power and meaning converge. It is where particular 
interpretations are backed by the policing force of the state. Finding oneself on law’s 
“field of pain and death”33 is hardly the occasion to indulge postmodern irony.
 New forms of visual empowerment and deceit must be confronted head on. In 
the age of the digital image, all information is fungible—words, sounds, and images 
alike. It is a world in which the perfect digital copy makes nostalgia for the original 
seem more than a little quaint. Benjamin’s elegy for the “aura”—by which he meant 
to describe the peculiar power of the singular artwork to concentrate the mind of the 
viewer in the here and now of its unique and inimitable presence—barely carries on 
the late modern air. The strains of the aura are rather foreign to our ears (and eyes) 
these days against the digital din that demands and endlessly divides our attention. 
The aura? What could Benjamin have been thinking of? Might it be that some 
things become so irretrievably lost that we hardly can be bothered to speak of them?
 Little could Benjamin have imagined how far the original would fall, or that one 
of the last battlegrounds for the aura might end up inside the courtroom itself. But so 
it has come to pass. A world of digital apparitions, of phantom beings stripped of 
their reality—does this not describe at least a significant part of the contemporary 
multimedia world of law on the screen? What term might we imagine for such a 
world, stripped of its aura? How about “purgatory”?34 That, in any event, is the very 
term a federal judge selected in United States v. Yates.35 He chose it to describe the 
fate of video images that a majority of his colleagues on the bench saw fit to cast out 
of the courtroom, on constitutional grounds, as not present enough to comport with 
the law’s fundamental responsibility to actual presences, to reality, if you will.
30. Jennifer Deger, Shimmering Screens: Making Media in an Aboriginal Community (2006).
31. Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain: The Science of Our Moral Dilemmas (2005).
32. See generally Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age, supra note 25.
33. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1606–07 (1986).
34. “The Italian word ombra in Dante’s lexicon means both ‘shadow’ (as in the shadow cast by a body) and 
‘shade’ (a term for the form of the soul in the afterlife).” Guido Guinizzelli & Arnaut Daniel, Terrace 7: 
Lust, Univ. of Tex., http://danteworlds.laits.utexas.edu/purgatory/09lust.html#guin (last visited Aug. 
21, 2012). In the action-adventure video game, Dante’s Inferno (Visceral Games/Electronic Arts 
2010), the shades in question really are digital simulacra.
35. 438 F.3d 1307, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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 The situation is paradoxical, perplexing even, the more one thinks about it. A 
majority of the court has reversed on appeal a trial judge’s decision to permit the live 
trial testimony, via two-way video transmission, of a witness based in a foreign 
country. According to the appellate ruling, reliance upon these images in court 
violates the criminal defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against 
him. The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause requires the actual presence of 
the witnesses in court, says the majority. Not so, the dissent retorts. According to the 
dissent, the majority has mistakenly cast the video testimony into “constitutional 
purgatory.” The dissenting judge’s perplexity is manifest: “The witnesses are not 
‘present’ enough to be considered in the defendant’s ‘presence’ yet are somehow 
‘present’ in court where the defendant is also ‘present.’”
 What ontological quandary is this? And what paradox? Are we really being asked 
to determine how much presence an electronic image has when it is projected onto a 
screen inside the courtroom? (How present does a technologically reproduced image 
have to be in order to pass constitutional muster?) Physically, the witness is in Australia; 
his image is in an American courtroom. Are the trial participants then looking upon a 
mere shade, the ghostly presence of a digital simulacrum? Purgatory indeed.
 But wait. Could it be that one man’s shade is another’s living presence? Let us see 
if we can disentangle this metaphysical conundrum. On the dissenting judge’s 
analysis, the forge of purgatory comes from the law that bans the image from 
appearing in court. On this reckoning, the majority has mistakenly construed the 
constitutional text as an agent of purgation, for in the dissent’s view, the witness’s 
video testimony is indeed real enough to meet the Constitution’s demand for presence 
at trial. For the dissent, then, the evil to be removed (the source of unreality, if you 
will) is constitutional purgatory itself. Not so for the majority. For them, the 
testimonial images are simply not real enough to meet the Constitution’s demand for 
presence. For the majority, then, the Constitution is an agent of reality, and the evil 
to be removed is the unreality of the images themselves.
 Who says law in late modernity is no longer an ordeal?
 In the remainder of this article, I will occupy this ambiguous space, where 
“shades” and “presences” uncomfortably commingle. It is a domain well suited to 
illustrate the ramifications for law of “iconoclash.” Iconoclash describes our deeply 
rooted love/hate relationship with visual images.36 That conflict is now playing out 
in law as it is in art and science and popular culture more generally. And it is 
happening everywhere. In what follows, I shall argue that the contest over the 
meaning of words like “shade” and “presence” and “purgatory” and “reality” captures 
the complexity and, yes, the profundity of the controversy at issue. It is an 
epistemological, ontological, and perhaps even metaphysical tangle, for it ref lects 
deep uncertainties about the nature of reality itself—of what we can know about 
what we see displayed on electronic screens before our eyes. What is it that authorizes 
the truth claims of digital images as a matter of law? As images play out inside 
36. See Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art (Bruno Latour & Peter 
Weibel eds., 2002).
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courtrooms not only across America, but around the globe, this query increasingly 
presses upon us. It is pertinent wherever electronic screens technologically reproduce 
visual evidence or visual arguments that lay claim to truth-based justice.
 How much reality do images bear (bare), or occlude, and what difference does 
this make in the outcome of real cases? What might it mean, in terms of justice or 
fairness or the right outcome in a given case, when a legal decision is made on the 
basis of images that delight the senses, without more—as opposed, let us say, to 
images whose authenticity carries greater ontological authority, the kind of presence 
that staves off purgatory, and that produces an ethical demand, the kind that we 
properly associate with the countenance of the real?
 Law deals with matters of judgment. So what we are really asking is not simply 
how much presence does an image present, but also how much presence ought an 
image to present to authorize the force of law? How does one speak of such things? 
In the newly emerging field of visual jurisprudence, one way to describe such an 
image is by reference to the aesthetic and ethical sublime.37 There are images that 
disappear upon consumption, and images that take us in, that make us shudder with 
a significance that is hard to explain, but harder still to dismiss. The former (the 
sensate image as simulacrum) is used up once its effects are done; the latter (the 
image as sublime) persists in the overdetermined mystery of its irreducible presence. 
 If we are persuaded that such a thing is possible, that there is a kind of ontological 
authenticity to the technologically reproduced image, then perhaps its aura has not, as 
Benjamin thought, been utterly lost after all. If such a possibility exists, then the task 
at hand is to cultivate the cognitive and cultural competencies that allow us to 
ascertain the telltale signs of such a visual event along with the communicative efficacy 
that can do justice to the entangled aesthetic and ethical reality that it reveals.
 This is the challenge we face when law migrates to the screen. In the current age 
of the digital baroque, the nature of screened reality is sorely contested, though what 
drives that contest might well be soon forgotten. This manner of speaking (and 
seeing) signals the emergence of visual jurisprudence. Visual jurisprudence inherits, 
but must also transform, the hermeneutic and phenomenological challenge of textual 
interpretation, for now it is the radiance of the image with which we are concerned 
(in addition to, though apart from, the radiance of language).38
 The remainder of this article will proceed in four parts. Part II begins with the 
federal court opinion in Yates. This case will serve as a basis for contextualizing a 
central challenge of law’s current life on the screen, namely: the status and nature of 
visual images inside the courtroom. A brief discussion of the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment will set the scene for the ensuing judicial clash over how 
real (or how “present”) video-based testimony may need to be. Part III develops the 
analysis further by exploring new ways of thinking and speaking about visual images 
inside the courtroom. What legitimates the truth of the image as a matter of law, 
37. For a fuller discussion of this matter, see Sherwin, Visualizing Law, supra note 6.
38. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 443 (1975) (“It is not the radiance shed on a form 
from without. Rather it is the nature of the form itself to be radiant . . . .”).
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and what leads to its derogation as mere sensation or empty ornamentation? These 
are the kinds of questions that impel and shape the quest for visual prudence in the 
age of the digital baroque. Part IV seeks to advance the cause of visual prudence in 
the law by providing illustrations of several different ontological and epistemological 
modalities of the image. Proceeding from actual visual practices inside the courtroom, 
in this part we shall seek to distinguish the merely ornamental (the visual rhetoric of 
sensation and delight, evident in what I shall refer to as the “magical realism” of pop 
science) from the ontological demand of the aesthetic and ethical sublime. The 
category of the sublime, I shall contend, helps us come to grips with the aura (if it 
exists) of the visual object in view.
 The article concludes with a revision of Walter Benjamin’s sweeping condemnation 
of the technologically reproduced image, his claim that “there is no facsimile of the 
aura.”39 In a world where perfect digital copies proliferate (where it’s “copies all the 
way down”) the need for an originary presence may hardly seem to arise. I shall argue, 
however, that such a conclusion is both unwise and unwarranted. Benjamin has no 
doubt gotten hold of a brilliant insight regarding the risks associated with 
technologically reproduced images. He commits an injustice, however, by tarring all 
such images with the same brush. For Benjamin, it is as if every technologically 
reproduced image embodies no more than empty, “distractive” ornamentation, as if 
they all serve as vehicles for detached sensation whose “percussive” impact ends 
immediately upon their consumption. But as the discussion of Yates in Part II suggests, 
and the larger critical analysis in Parts III and IV elucidates, the electronic world of 
screen images is a mixed world of shades and presences. It encompasses a range of 
visual realities, from purgatorial traces of sealed, algorithmically generated digital 
simulacra that assume the appearance of monadic totalities, to uncanny presences that 
manifest the aesthetic and ethical sublime. In sum, the claim being made here is that, 
notwithstanding Benjamin’s disavowal, standing before at least some technologically 
reproduced images, the singular, irreducible call of the sublime persists, and in so 
doing, so, too, may law’s fealty to the real. In this sense, the commodified image that 
we consume, and in consuming use up, may be a part of the new visual landscape of 
law, but it does not account for the whole. Law’s empire—including the multi-modal 
media that it occupies and deploys and the broad rhetorical spectrum that it spans—
may be changing, but the contest for truth-based justice goes on.
II.  VIRTUAL TESTIFYING IN UNITED STATES V. ANITA YATES: PURGATORY OR 
ACTUALITY?
 In the Yates case, two defendants were charged with mail fraud, conspiracy to 
defraud the United States, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and various 
prescription drug-related offenses. The government identified two “essential 
witnesses” who were beyond the government’s subpoena powers and unwilling to 
travel to the United States to testify against the defendants at trial. To solve this 
problem, the government sought to have the witnesses testify via video teleconference 
39. Benjamin, supra note 2, at 260.
22
VISUAL JURISPRUDENCE
from Australia. The district court granted that request. The jury convicted the 
defendants, and an appeal followed.
 The central issue raised on appeal addressed the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment right of all criminal defendants to confront the witnesses against them 
at trial. Was a two-way videoconference sufficient to fulfill the demands of 
confrontation? The defendants, the jury, and the judge were able to see the witnesses 
on a screen as they testified in real time from Australia. Likewise, the witnesses were 
able to see the defendants as the witnesses’ direct and cross-examination unfolded in 
court. Nevertheless, a majority of the appellate court decided that this procedure fell 
short of what the Sixth Amendment required.
 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied in part upon the authority of Coy v. 
Iowa,40 a U.S. Supreme Court case that was decided in 1988. In Coy the high court 
insisted, in an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, that the word “confront” 
in the text of the Sixth Amendment means “face-to-face” confrontation.41 The 
defendant in Coy was charged with sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls. In 
order to protect the victims from the trauma of having to face their alleged abuser in 
court, the judge allowed them to testify from behind a screen. This blocked the 
defendant from the witnesses’ sight, though he could dimly see them as they testified. 
For Justice Scalia and the majority for which he spoke, the violation of defendant’s 
confrontation right was clear. The countervailing policy objective of safeguarding 
the well-being of the victims was deemed insufficient to mitigate the offense to the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. This view would shift a mere two years later. In 
Maryland v. Craig,42 in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the high 
court ruled that the use of two-way closed circuit video to protect the well-being of a 
victim of sexual abuse was justified. On this analysis, the policy objective of 
protecting the well-being and testimonial capacity of the victim justified a limited 
intrusion upon the defendant’s confrontation right.
 According to Justice O’Connor, even without “face-to-face” confrontation, the 
combined safeguards of ensuring that the witness testify under oath and submit to 
cross examination, and that jurors see the demeanor of the witness while making her 
statement, suffice to meet the general truth-testing objectives that the Sixth 
Amendment lays out. This was so, according to the Craig majority, particularly in 
light of the important public policy at issue, for it was found in this case (unlike in 
Coy) that the witnesses would indeed suffer difficulties testifying if they were forced 
to confront the accused face-to-face inside the open courtroom.
 In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Craig majority’s balancing 
of competing interests was prohibited by the Constitution. The court, he contended, 
was not authorized to substitute anything less than the full panoply of truth-testing 
measures that the drafters of the Confrontation Clause saw fit to inscribe in the 
40. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
41. Id. at 1016. In pertinent part, the constitutional text reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
42. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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constitutional text. Indeed, for Justice Scalia, it is precisely the difficulty of testifying 
face-to-face with the accused that constitutes the chief truth-seeking safeguard that the 
drafters had in mind. As Justice Scalia put it: “That a defendant loses his right to 
confront a witness when that could cause the witness not to testify is rather like saying 
that the defendant loses his right to counsel when counsel would save him.”43
 With these precedents as background, the Yates court faced the choice of either 
opting for Justice O’Connor’s balancing test or Justice Scalia’s stricter adherence to 
the “plain meaning” of the constitutional text. The Yates majority chose the latter. In 
so doing, they expressed the concern that distant testifying might reduce, or perhaps 
eliminate altogether, those “intangible elements of the ordeal of testifying” that, as 
Justice Scalia noted in Coy, lay at the heart of the traditional truth-testing method 
that the constitutional drafters of the Confrontation Clause had in mind. Given the 
lack of equivalence between face-to-face and distance testifying, the Yates majority 
insisted that “exceptional circumstances” must exist in order to warrant departing 
from the confrontation right that all criminal defendants enjoy.44 Unlike the 
“important public policy” described by Justice O’Connor in Craig—namely, to 
protect young victims who were specifically found to be unable to testify in open 
court before the glare of the accused—in Yates no comparable interest was deemed to 
have been presented by the state. The state’s expressed need for the testimony “to 
make a case and to expeditiously resolve it” was not equivalent to the policy goal of 
safeguarding the emotional wellbeing and testimonial capacity of the young victims 
in Craig.45 Convenience, expedition, and the desire to succeed in a criminal 
prosecution are simply not important enough public policy objectives to warrant 
impairing defendant’s confrontation right.
 Needless to say, the dissent in Yates saw matters otherwise. Effective law 
enforcement alone, in the dissenters’ view, constitutes an important policy goal. 
Moreover, as in Craig, here, too, the dissent found sufficient indicia of evidentiary 
reliability to warrant substituting the witness’s physical presence in court with a 
virtual presence via two-way video. At the core of the dissent’s disagreement with 
the Yates majority’s dispatch of the witness’s distant testimony into what the dissent 
dubbed “constitutional purgatory” there lies a fundamental difference of opinion 
regarding the nature and efficacy of distant (as compared to live, in-court) testimony.46 
43. Id. at 867.
44. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006).
45. See id. at 1316. Notably, there was no actual finding that the witnesses in Yates could not travel from 
Australia. All they claimed was that they preferred not to. See id. at 1315.
46. Id. at 1325–27. I omit here discussion of whether the testimony of the witness may be deemed an out-of-
court statement that qualifies as admissible “hearsay.” In the hearsay context, relevant issues include what it 
means for the witness to be “unavailable” and what constitutes a testimonial statement. Compare Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (ruling that “testimonial,” out-of-court statements are inadmissible if 
the accused did not have the opportunity to cross-examine that accuser and that accuser is unavailable at 
trial), with Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1150 (2011) (holding that under emergency conditions a dying 
witness’s identification of defendant as his assailant together with the location of the shooting were “non-
testimonial” statements and thus did not warrant sixth amendment confrontation at trial).
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For the dissent, the defendant’s ability to see the witness on a screen in court, and 
the witnesses’ ability to see the defendant as each witness testified, is good enough 
confrontation for Sixth Amendment purposes. For the Yates majority, it is not.
 Thus the debate is joined. To what extent does “virtual” testifying (what Justice 
Scalia once described as “a television set beaming electrons that portray a defendant’s 
image”47) differ from the live presence of face-to-face confrontation? The Yates 
majority assumes that virtual testifying falls short of the real thing. But by what 
measure? Let us consider the possibilities.
 At the outset, every virtual witness faces a choice when testifying. She may either 
look at the monitor before her, or stare directly into the lens of the camera as she 
speaks. The monitor will permit her to see others inside the courtroom. By forgoing 
the camera, however, she will appear to be avoiding eye contact with her interlocutor. 
Of course, even if she chooses to forgo the monitor and stares directly into the 
camera she is only creating the appearance of eye contact. Since she is actually sitting 
alone, staring at an inanimate object, it is very difficult for a real emotional connection 
with her questioner to take place. This loss of connection has been associated with a 
sense of “derealization” and “dehumanization” of the virtual witness.48
 Good choices are elusive here. If the virtual witness shifts her gaze from the 
monitor to the camera and back again she risks creating an impression of evasiveness 
or lack of credibility. When her interlocutor sees her look away, it may appear as if 
this is occurring in direct reaction to the question posed, as if the distant witness’s 
discomfort with the query (or with her own response) has made her “dodgy.” This 
susceptibility to perceptual and cognitive error—whether it is the false inference of 
causation described above or some other miscue—is suggestive of the distortions to 
which screen-based legal proceedings are prone.
 Let us consider as well the obvious fact that teleconferencing only allows a viewer 
to see what the camera frames, when it frames it.49 This is not the same as looking 
47. See Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89 (2002) 
(statement of Scalia, J.).
48. See Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings: Legal and 
Empirical Issues and Directions for Research, 28 Law & Pol’y 211, 215 (2006). In the immigration law 
context, for example, studies have shown that about half the number of grants of asylum occur in virtual 
hearings as compared to live ones. See Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or 
Assembly-Line Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Cases, 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 259, 
279–80 (2008) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Office of 
Planning, Analysis & Tech. Statistical Request OPA 07-116 (2005)); Aaron Haas, Videoconferencing 
in Immigration Proceedings, 5 Pierce L. Rev. 59, 74 (2006); see also Robert Feldman & Richard B. Chesley, 
Who is Lying, Who Is Not: An Attributional Analysis of the Effects of Nonverbal Behavior on Judgments of 
Defendant Believability, 2 Behav. Sci. & L. 109, 110 (1984).
49. As legendary cinematographer Haskell Wexler once put it, when the camera turns on—beginning at 
one discrete point in time and ending in another—reality is changed. Conference, Visual Evidence VII, 
U.C.L.A. (Aug. 20, 1999). See, e.g., Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld 42, 46 (1990) 
(discussing the extent to which we are situated in the world, and see as a particularly situated person 
from a particular vantage, toward others otherwise situated).
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wherever, whenever, and in the order one wants, inside a courtroom.50 Lighting, 
camera angles, and sound serve as filters, or traces, of technological mediation that 
leave their own singular mark on what appears on the screen.51 Looking down upon, 
or up at, the figure in the frame, zooming into his or her intimate space, leaving her 
face partially obscured in darkness—these choices, and many others besides, all help 
to characterize the image that is being projected. Each of these framing decisions, in 
conjunction with widely shared cultural models or scripts or genres that viewers 
unconsciously bring to the screen when interpreting what they see there, helps to 
shape the way the viewer perceives the image on the screen. If the information we 
gather live from someone’s facial expressions or physical demeanor goes beyond the 
information available from the screen, then screen-based judgments are to some extent 
distorted. For instance, what if the witness’s nervously jiggling leg, or momentarily 
darkening eyes, escapes the view of the camera? Or what if the audio fails to convey 
subtle changes in vocal tone that connote a shift in nuance and expressive meaning?52 
The viewer’s assessment of credibility based on limited access to the witness’s 
demeanor will be diminished.
 Apart from the mechanics and effects of framing, one may also ask whether our 
encounter with what is on the screen accurately replicates the “crucible” effect of face-
to-face confrontation, and of cross-examination in particular. For example, does the 
screen image activate the same (or perhaps a different set of) fantasies and associations? 
In open court one can imagine a witness on the stand thinking, “What if the defendant 
were to jump up from behind the table at which he is now seated and strike me?” By 
precluding the possibility of a fantasy like this, the screen may alter the way the 
witness testifies in court. Are there other affects or impulses (what the psychoanalytic 
community refers to as the phenomenon of interpersonal “transference”) that the 
screen fails to replicate? In a similar vein, we may also wonder whether a witness’s 
response to an advocate’s projected feelings—what the other makes me feel in response 
to his or her affect (what is known in the psychoanalytic community as “counter-
transference”)—also occurs in response to images on the screen.
50. Though the “all-at-once-ness” (or gestalt) of unmediated perception may elude the selectivity of the 
camera’s mechanical eye, the gestalt of watching images on the screen emulates that of unmediated 
perception. This phenomenon lies at the heart of so-called “naïve realism,” the firm belief by the viewer 
that he or she has seen all that she needs in order to be certain of the reality the screen shows. See 
Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age, supra note 25.
51. See, e.g., Byron Reeves & Clifford Nass, The Media Equation: How People Treat Computers, 
Television, and New Media Like Real People and Places (1996) (noting that people commonly 
equate media images and reality). If viewers treat screen images as equivalent to reality, the witness will 
be held responsible for how she appears notwithstanding extrinsic (technology-based) factors that help 
to shape and inform that appearance.
52. According to one study, words account for only seven percent of meaning in oral communication. Voice 
accounts for thirty-seven percent, and body language accounts for a whopping fifty-five percent. See 
Albert Mehrabian, Nonverbal Communication 178 (1972). The effects of technology-based 
distortions in sound and image at virtual hearings, therefore, may be substantial. Yet, because these 
effects are not consciously discerned they remain invisible.
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 This lack, if that is the case, may have consequences not only in the way jurors, 
for example, respond to (and judge) the demeanor of the witness, but also in the way 
an opposing party’s counsel goes about the business of cross-examining a witness. 
Impeachment strategies during cross-examination often depend upon intuited 
assessments of the witness’s state of mind. What question, framed in what way, in 
what voice, from what distance, and with what affect, will have the desired 
impeachment effect on the testifying witness?53 Without this analytic and affect-
based gauge will cross-examination be impaired? Or consider shifting from the 
advocate’s perspective to that of the virtual witness. Deprived of an immediate sense 
of how his or her words and demeanor may be affecting others inside the courtroom, 
does the distant witness lack the opportunity to gauge the actual efficacy (or 
inefficacy) of his communication and adapt his words or communication style or 
demeanor accordingly?
 These concerns suggest that a distant witness might well say different things, 
and speak or behave differently, were he speaking live inside the courtroom. This is 
not simply a matter of impeding the witness’s empathy or disrupting the usual 
feedback system that constitutes the ecology of effective communication. It may also 
be the case that speaking to a camera, or to images on a screen, prompts different 
fantasies as well as different affects as compared to performing speech live in court. 
Of course, this shift away from live communication might encourage a timid witness 
to say something to the camera that he or she might not be able to say directly in 
person. By the same token, it might also invite the witness to act on impulses more 
akin to showmanship—performing for the camera, so to speak.54 Such a performance 
is in a certain respect sealed off from external reality, and thus remains more prone 
to solipsistic (or hyper-subjective) thoughts, fantasies, and associations. At the same 
time, the screen might also invite other screen-based associations. Here we confront 
a different kind of subjectivity—one that is constituted by our immersion in the 
world of film and television and video games. If we tend to become the object we 
think with,55 what is there to prevent the distant witness, or any screen viewer in 
court for that matter, to associate the image on the screen with other screen-based 
images that the viewer has seen before? This is one of the ways in which popular 
culture insinuates itself back into the courtroom. Viewers of screens inside the 
courtroom tend to see with eyes that have been conditioned by other popular 
images.56 Other stock characters or stock narratives to which the viewer associates as 
she watches may now help shape and inform the meaning of the images she sees. 
(“Oh, this is just like a scene from . . . .”) This is the way life imitates art.57
53. See generally Michael E. Tigar, Examining Witnesses (2d ed. 1972).
54. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 591 (1965) (noting that publicity “introduces into the conduct of a 
criminal trial the element of professional ‘showmanship’”).
55. See generally Christopher Bollas, The Evocative Object World (2009). 
56. See generally Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, supra note 5.
57. Consider, in this regard, Justice Scalia’s reference to the feature film The French Connection (20th 
Century Fox 1971) during oral argument in Scott v. Harris, 127 U.S. 1209 (2007). For Justice Scalia, the 
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 If testimony on the screen looks more like TV, or is reminiscent of something 
from the movies, does that mean that viewers might read the image in a different 
way than they would in real life? Might viewers unconsciously bring film or TV 
associations to their experience of what they see on the screen? Might it be that the 
more like TV something appears, the less real it feels, and therefore the less 
threatening, and less likely to serve as an accurate measure of truth? Or, for that 
matter, might the benchmark for belief substitute a pop cultural template for an 
unmediated, experiential one? In that case, the more like TV or film, the more real 
the image may seem.
 There is a socio-cultural repertoire and archive of stock moves and associations 
that accompany discrete forms of experience, the social scenes and scripts that we 
know and unconsciously replicate in everyday life. In a similar vein, we also recognize 
and respond to the discrete repertoire and archive of stock moves and associations in 
specific forms of media. We tend not to experience a live performance in the theater 
the same way we experience screen images in the cinema. Might the intervention of 
the camera and the monitor’s screen-reality inside the courtroom disrupt or in some 
way fragment and complicate the continuity of a live performance aesthetic with its 
attendant expectations and interpretive strategies and outcomes?58 With what kind of 
dramaturgy, governed by what aesthetic rules and cognitive/cultural expectations are 
we dealing when we enter an electronically mediated courtroom?
 These are only some of the considerations that help to suggest why the Yates 
majority was correct in assuming (as have most other courts considering the matter59) 
that distant or virtual testimony on the screen is not equivalent to face-to-face 
testimony inside the courtroom. Based precisely on this assumption, Justice Scalia 
has said that “virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual constitutional 
rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real ones.”60 But can we be so sure 
that we have gotten our categories down? What is “virtual,” and what is “real”?
 In the next part we will step back from the particulars of the Yates debate in order 
to assess some of the larger issues that it raises. Here we will address head on the 
epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical quandaries that arise when law lives, 
as other images do, on electronic screens in court, and out.
film served as a benchmark for evaluating a crucial police surveillance video in the Harris case. For a 
transcript of the oral argument, go to http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1631/
argument (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
58. See Branislav Jakovljevic, Wooster Baroque, TDR: The Drama Review 54:3, 87–122 (Fall 2010).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 1998) (“Studies have 
suggested that television and video screens necessarily present antiseptic, watered down versions of 
reality. Much of the interaction of the courtroom is missed.”).
60. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89, 93–94 (2002) 
(statement of Scalia, J.).
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III. THE NEW RHETORIC OF VISUALIZING LAW
 Rhetoric is all about efficacy. What can we say or show to win belief? According 
to the cognitive psychologists, understanding suffices for belief to occur. Once we 
grasp what we see (or hear or read) we accept what we grasp.61 The speed, vividness, 
and emotional force of our mental response to images only enhance our sense of their 
truth. In this respect, visual delight may well serve as a measure of visual truth. The 
subject who delights in the image she takes in has reason (or at least motive) to 
believe in the source of that delight. Belief allows and invites ownership of the 
affective payoff that a particular visual experience allows. In this sense, the truth of 
the image lies on its surface, as on the viewer’s skin.62 It functions by way of its use 
value, which is to say, the feelings its consumption permits.
 But use value is not the only way to measure the truth of an image. Throughout 
history images have been treated as being imbued with something like an aura, a kind 
of halo or surplus of meaning that is irreducible to what they actually depict. As 
William Mitchell has written, the image seems to return our gaze: as if somehow it 
had absorbed and reflects back our individual and collective emotional and even erotic 
investments.63 In this sense, we may say that images can be ontologically overloaded. 
They sometimes shimmer with an invisible presence; a strange surplus or aura renders 
their impact even more vivid to the senses, even more cognitively potent.64 And this is 
so despite the fact that we remain ill-prepared to articulate why or how this 
phenomenon takes place. Yet, the mystery is not without consequence. We think with 
visual objects. We partake in the state of being that they radiate. This is what it is like 
to enter into the field of the image (rather than use it up in the act of consumption).
 We have seen this ontological debate before. For Plato it was a matter of gazing 
at shadows cast upon the cave wall as opposed to glimpsing the radiance of the 
original (“archetypal”) Idea. It is the same quandary that persists in the long and 
oftentimes violent history of iconoclasm. Is the visual object a sacramental aid in the 
process of ritual devotion, or is it an abomination that falsely proclaims a divine 
visual presence? In more modern vernacular, we ask: Is it real or just a simulacrum? 
Have we been cast into the virtual realm of some alien digital matrix, left to wander 
in a baroque maze of dreams within dreams?65 Or, perhaps making the best of what 
61. See, e.g., Deborah Prentice & Richard Gerrig, Exploring the Boundary Between Fiction and Reality, in 
Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology 529–46 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
62. For more on the nature of “haptic visuality” (the idea of touching a film with one’s eyes and perhaps 
being touched in turn), see Laura Marks, The Skin of the Film (2000), and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 248–49 (Alphonso Lingis trans., Claude Lefort ed., 
Northwestern Univ. Press 1968) (1964); see also Alison Young, The Scene of Violence: Cinema, 
Crime, Affect (2010).
63. See W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (2004); James 
Elkins, The Object Stares Back (1996).
64. See Sherwin, Visualizing Law, supra note 6; Jennifer Deger, Shimmering Screens (2006).
65. There has been a spate of popular films over recent years that revolve around this quintessentially 
baroque theme. See, e.g., The Matrix, supra note 28; eXistenz (Alliance Atlantis Commc’ns 1999); 
Inception (Warner Bros. Pictures 2010).
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we cannot defy, rather than harping on the spectacular emptiness of the image,66 
maybe we should simply yield to its allure. As Mitchell writes, faced with “a 
nauseating void of signifiers,” it is possible to choose “nihilistic abandonment to free 
play and arbitrary will.”67 This strategy marks the embrace of reality as endless 
carnival, a perpetual baroque spectacle, or masque.
 The seventeenth century baroque like the current digital baroque love/hate 
relationship with images (Bruno Latour’s “iconoclash”) ref lects an historically 
recurrent “either/or” response to the image.68 Either it is what it shows or it is not. 
Either it is a transparent frame, like a window onto reality, or it is a deceit that ought 
to be utterly rejected. In this way, we see that the iconoclastic impulse is parasitic 
upon naïve realism.
 In the end, it comes down to shades and presences, the perennial epistemological, 
ontological, and perhaps even metaphysical quandary: How real (if at all) is the 
image before us? What does it portend, reality or purgatory? Being, or mere 
simulacra? A sublime presence, or empty delight? The answer depends on the subject 
who gazes as well as the nature of the image she sees, consumes, or is taken in by. 
When it is a matter of consuming visual objects, the subject is the measure of the 
image’s aesthetic worth and truth value. By contrast, when the subject is estranged 
from herself by her encounter with the otherness of the image, then it is necessary to 
go beyond the subject to discern the meaning or truth-value of what has occurred.
 This is not meant to be taken as the strict opposition that this phrasing may seem 
to suggest. After all, the utterly strange remains impenetrable. We get nothing from 
it. Meaning is always an admixture of the strange and the familiar. But the uncanny 
experience of an image that embodies an ontological surplus tells us that more is 
there than meets the eye. What makes an image uncanny is precisely what lies 
outside the viewing subject. Here we encounter the image’s ineluctable otherness, the 
irreducible visual remainder. There is something that the image itself cannot wholly 
represent or contain. It is the strange absence that we encounter as an uncanny 
presence. That is the way we experience the aura of the image.69
 In law as well? Yes. When law lives the life of images it lives as images do: in 
shades and presences, in shallow delight and uncanny fullness. Let us see how this 
might be so inside the courtroom.
66. See, e.g., Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (1994).
67. W.J.T. Mitchell, What Is an Image? in 15 New Literary History: Image/Imago/Imagination 503, 
519 (1984); Gilles Deleuze, Plato and the Simulacrum 27 (Rosalind Krauss trans., 1983).
68. See Sherwin, Visualizing Law, supra note 6.
69. Compare Wallace Stevens’s invocation in his sublime poem, The Idea of Order at Key West (“She sang 
beyond the genius of the sea. The water never formed to mind or voice, Like a body wholly body, 
f luttering Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry, That 
was not ours although we understood, Inhuman, of the veritable ocean.”). Wallace Stevens, The Idea 
of Order at Key West, in The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens 128 (1990). 
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IV. SHADES AND PRESENCES INSIDE THE COURTROOM
 We will begin with spectacle, the realm of visual delight in the popular domain 
of magical realism. In short, we will first go under, to the underworld of purgatory, 
so to speak, before re-emerging, to the extent we can, into the fuller light of actuality. 
It is fitting, therefore, to offer a few words concerning the baroque, for the baroque 
is the domain of metaphysical anxiety par excellence. Gripped by ontological anxiety, 
baroque and neo-baroque culture leads us to wonder: Have we been trapped in a hall 
of mirrors or of dreams within dreams? Is this but a shadow world that we live in, 
what we have come to call in our time the virtual world of digital simulation, the air-
tight realm of algorithmically calculated simulacra?
 Consider in this regard art historian S.J. Freedberg’s characterization of the 
sixteenth-century genre of high mannerist painting, what he calls the “manic 
ferment” and packed extravagance of these eccentric forms, with their strange 
elongation and self-conscious aesthetic placement.70 This is the familiar strategy of 
baroque distraction. Baroque representations must perpetually make up in emotional 
intensity, mobility of expression, and an extravagant multiplicity of form, for the felt 
emptiness that lies at their core.
 Now consider the aesthetics of popular visual entertainment, and in particular the 
contemporary aesthetic that I refer to here as the magical realism of pop science. 
Studies have shown that the mere presence of a photograph at trial (even a neutral 
one) significantly increases the conviction rate compared to when no photos are shown 
(up to 38% from only 8.8%).71 The mere mention of “neuroscience” has the power to 
enhance the credibility of claims made in its name.72 It stands to reason that the union 
of the two (visualizing neuroscience) would constitute a potent tool of persuasion 
inside the courtroom. It already has in the precincts of science. Between 2003 and 
2008, on average, a thousand peer-reviewed scholarly articles on neuroscience were 
being published every month.73 The claims being made were wide-ranging, and 
sometimes elaborate. As early as 1994, for example, Francis Crick had written: “Your 
joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal 
identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve 
cells and their associated molecules.”74 The neuroscientific refrain (“mind is matter”) 
has resounded far and wide. In this view, free will dissolves in a bath of bio-chemical 
processes. No wonder Michael Gazzaniga asserted that advances in neuroscience 
70. S.J. Freedberg, Painting in Italy: 1500–1600, at 446–49 (Yale Univ. Press 3d ed. 1993) (1971).
71. See generally D.A. Bright & J. Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and 
Jury Decision-Making, in Law and Human Behavior 183 (2006). 
72. See Deena Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. Cognitive 
Neuroscience 470–77 (2008); see also J.D. Trout, Seduction Without Cause: Uncovering Neurophilia, 12 
Trends in Cognitive Sci. 281 (2008).
73. O.C. Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1273 
(2007).
74. Francis Crick, Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul 3 (1994).
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would someday “dominate the entire legal system.”75 How could it not, if the hard-
core determinist claims being made in its name turned out to be correct?
 To that end, the efficacy of digital visualization tools such fMRIs (functional 
magnetic resonance images) in particular, which purport to show the human 
organism at work from the inside, has not been lost on neuroscientists and trial 
lawyers alike. As one experimental psychologist observed, however, “[t]here is a real 
danger that pictures of blobs on brains seduce one into thinking that we can now 
directly observe psychological constructs.”76 Yet, despite these concerns, with 
increasing frequency fMRIs have been showing up in court in personal injury cases 
(to make brain injuries visible to jurors), in criminal cases (to establish incompetence 
or insanity), and in the sentencing stage of death penalty cases (to show mitigation, 
which is to say, to support the defense claim that execution is inappropriate when 
brain abnormalities diminish the defendant’s culpability).77 At the same time, crime 
scene investigators are increasingly submitting every shred of forensic proof for lab 
testing—leading to ever growing backlogs. As Antony Zuiker, the creator of the 
popular TV series CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, put it, “blood, hair, saliva, skin et 
cetera are forensically designed to tell an investigator what has happened without 
having any witness to a crime.”78
 The message is clear: while witnesses may lie or make mistakes, science does not. 
In this way, new digital forensic technologies signal a return to the early days of 
evidence, when the credibility of physical evidence was thought to far outweigh 
eyewitness testimony.79 If there is one thing upon which commentators seem to agree 
it is this: CSI technology is not just science, it is super-science.80 And judging by the 
images that popular, forensics-minded TV shows present, the visual aesthetics of the 
new visual technologies are beautiful to behold. Of course, that is part of their power. 
Aesthetic delight in the image encourages a sense of understanding and acceptance, 
and that response, cognitive psychologists tell us, is tantamount to belief. Add 
aesthetic delight to the widespread belief in the authority of science and you have a 
potent formula for producing belief (in what is true).
 This is certainly the case with regard to many of the new scientific technologies 
that are being used to generate visual evidence in court. To the untrained eye, which 
75. Gazzaniga, supra note 31.
76. See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of 
fMRI, Int’l L.J. in Context 233, 247 (2006) (quoting R. Henson, What Can Functional Neuroimaging 
Tell the Experimental Psychologist?, 58 Q.J. Experimental Psychol. A 193–233 (2005)).
77. See, e.g., Alexis Madrigal, Courtroom First: Brain Scan Used in Murder Sentencing, Wired Sci. (Nov. 23, 
2009) (Brain scan evidence claimed by the defense to show that the defendant’s brain was psychopathic 
was allowed into the sentencing portion of a murder trial in Chicago.).
78. Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & 
Ent. L.J. 429, 432 (2006). 
79. See Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in 
England (1992).
80. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About Forensic Science Affects Public 
Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 Jurimetrics J. 357–58 (2007).
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is to say, to the ordinary common sense of most judges and jurors, digital scans or 
fMRIs of the brain and other parts of the body look a lot like a photograph or an 
x-ray. But they are hardly that. The brain does not really ‘light up’ when active. 
fMRIs are actually statistical maps, visualizations of comparative data sets, 
calculating variations from the norm of the magnetic resonance of water molecules 
within localized blood flow to the brain. It is this highly complex information that 
has been digitally programmed to look like a brain lighting up in some parts, but not 
in others. In many cases, the resulting image may seem to provide direct evidence of 
the truth claim a particular advocate is seeking to prove.
 The natural inclination to view fMRIs as if they were photographs thus poses a 
serious risk of changing conviction and acquittal rates in cases involving fMRIs. Nor 
does this even begin to take into account the possible influence of the forensic pop 
science that is seen on TV shows like CSI: Crime Scene Investigation and its numerous 
offshoots. The fascination with cognitive neuroscience together with the wide-ranging 
evidentiary claims of digital forensic technology have spread from scientific circles to 
the domain of popular entertainment. Consider: from 2000, the year it debuted on 
TV, to 2006, CSI: Crime Scene Investigation grew into a franchise, with two spinoffs, 
CSI: Miami and CSI: New York. In 2004, each enjoyed over fourteen million weekly 
viewers, while the original series had over twenty-five million. Comparable shows, 
featuring crime-stopping, cutting-edge technologies have ensued, including: Without 
a Trace, Numbers, Criminal Minds, and Navy NCIS: Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service—on one network alone. Other networks have sought to ride the wave with 
spinoffs of their own, including: The Closer, Crossing Jordan, and Bones.81
 This cumulative visual feast seeks to assure us that science brings certainty. 
Forensic investigators probe crime scenes for physical clues that inevitably lead to 
likely suspects. Perhaps they will retrace the trajectory of a gunshot back to its source, 
as in one episode of NCIS.82 Look: that glare in the car window, it’s the flash of a gun 
caught fortuitously in the frame of an ATM camera, and now, by simply shifting the 
view on the screen to an overhead police surveillance camera we readily see the image 
of a driver in a van. His face is quickly scanned and just as quickly dumped into a 
database that immediately produces the identity investigators were seeking. Wondrous.
 Or like that episode on CSI, when traces of an attacker’s skin were caught under 
the fingernails of a child, the result of a struggle.83 After being placed in a machine 
the size of a toaster, the skin cells glow green, like numinous crystals of kryptonite, 
beautiful to behold. It’s a quick trip to a skin cell database, and presto! The criminal 
target’s face instantly looms large on an adjoining screen. Like magic, except that we 
are meant to conclude that what seems like magic is really the stuff of science, the 
product of the most sophisticated forensic technologies. Even the CSI labs seem 
81. See generally Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and 
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1335 (2009); Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, 
CSI and Its Effects: Media, Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 New Eng. L. Rev. 435 (2007).
82. Naval Criminal Investigative Service: Legend Part 1 (NBC television broadcast Apr. 28, 2009).
83. Crime Scene Investigation: Say Uncle (CBS television broadcast Nov. 13, 2008).
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magical, suffused as they are in a mystical violet light that adds to the uncanny 
beauty of the scientific truths produced there. But is it truth, or sheer visual delight 
parading as truth? If the latter, then the same possibility apparently haunts the 
computer screens of professional scientists and trial lawyers alike.
 The sheer visual delight of digital forensic technologies enchants the eye. As one 
researcher concluded, “exposure to brain images in the popular press, which provides 
a physical explanation for cognitive phenomena, likely inf luences the allure of 
cognitive neuroscience data.”84 This describes the power of the ersatz aura, the 
magical realism of pop science. Needless to say, the incentive to intensify this 
aesthetic effect—what some neuroscience researchers call the “Christmas tree 
effect”85—in order to enhance the credibility of what the image purports to show 
raises serious ethical concerns. And these concerns are now part and parcel of the 
challenge of the aesthetic of delight when sensational images seek the authority of 
law inside the courtroom.86
 But is the ornamental, sensate image all there is? Certainly not. What, then, 
might it be like to encounter in court an image that shines with the strange presence 
of the aesthetic and ethical sublime, the uncanny force of the visual remainder? 
Consider the following illustration from a recent murder trial. Here we encounter 
the eerie presence of a mother’s rage caught on a videotape that she thought (with 
near delusional fervor) would make the reason behind her defense plain to see. There 
is something uncanny here, a compelling presence that remains absent, yet haunts 
the viewer nevertheless. This is what occurred inside a New York City courtroom 
when a video documentary transfixed the attention of judge, jurors, and spectators 
alike. The occasion was the murder trial of Dr. Mazoltuv Borukhova. Borukhova 
was tried and ultimately convicted of having paid a distant relative, Mikhail Mallayev, 
$20,000 to kill her husband, Dr. Daniel Malakov. Malakov, from whom Borukhova 
had been estranged for the last three years, was the father of their four-year-old 
daughter, Michelle.
 The shooting took place in a Queens playground in plain view of the victim’s 
daughter, who stood nearby with her mother. The motive? Six days before, a family 
court judge had granted a transfer of custody from Borukhova to Malakov and this, 
so the state’s theory ran, was something Borukhova could not tolerate. The state 
argued that she could not accept losing custody of her only child. And to be sure, 
there was something exceedingly odd about Borukhova’s maternal protectiveness. 
For example, when Michelle’s father paid custody visits, Borukhova would do 
everything in her power to draw her daughter’s attention away from her father. 
84. David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of 
Scientific Reasoning, 107 Cognition 343, 351 (2008); see also Jay D. Aronson, The Law’s Use of Brain 
Evidence, 6 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 93, 101 (2010); Owen D. Jones, Joshua W. Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. 
Schall & Rene Marois, Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 5 Stan. Tech. L. 
Rev. 1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers].
85. See Trout, supra note 72. See generally Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers, supra note 84. 
86. See generally Michael Perlin, His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill: How Will Jurors Respond to 
Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 44 Akron L. Rev. 885 (2009).
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Michelle would remain firmly planted in her mother’s lap throughout each visit, 
occupied with toys and sweets that her mother provided. Malakov’s diminished 
status in his daughter’s eyes (she cried whenever he sought her attention) caused him 
to seek help—first, from a court-appointed guardian, then from the court itself. 
Over time, Judge Sidney Strauss came to realize that things were not quite right with 
Borukhova’s overweening possessiveness. She was “smothering” the child, he 
explained in the judicial opinion that accompanied his order that custody be shifted 
from mother to father. That order, prosecutors contended, enraged Borukhova, and 
sowed the seed for murder.
 But how do we know the state had it right? Well, among other indicators, there 
is a videotape, made by a professional videographer that Borukhova herself hired. 
The assignment was to document one of her daughter’s custody visits at the home of 
her father. And what do we see? But perhaps we should ask not what we see, but 
rather what lies beneath the surface of the scene that the video unfolds. What 
perturbations unsettle the apparent banality of a day in the life of a child of separated 
parents arriving at her father’s home? The scene opens with Michelle emerging from 
a car, clasped tightly in the arms of her mother. “Here we go,” we hear Borukhova 
announce. Michelle immediately breaks into loud sobs. Malakov arrives from the 
right, smiling broadly. He takes his daughter’s right arm, which had been hooked 
around Borukhova’s neck and shoulder. Then he tries to do the same with her left. 
“Very good,” he says in an assuring tone, as Michelle screams. “Ouch,” we hear 
Borukhova cry out. Then the estranged couple begin an odd dance, circling around 
and around, with Michelle locked between them. “Let the hand . . .” says Malakov, 
without completing his sentence. “Ouch,” Borukhova cries out again, louder this 
time. “Why are you pushing?” Malakov asks. “I’m not pushing,” Borukhova replies. 
And around they go, circling in their dance of unyielding custody. Slowly, parents 
and child make their way closer to the front gate of Malakov’s home. “Can you 
separate her legs?” he asks. Then he says it again, as the couple and child circle back 
onto the street outside the gate. Michelle’s screams grow louder. An elderly woman 
in a black hat, Borukhova’s mother perhaps, pushes Malakov’s brother, Joseph, off to 
the right. We hear his plaintive voice, “Why is she touching me?” After asking the 
same question five times, he cries out, “Please don’t touch me.” At the same time, a 
woman in a white shirt can be seen trying to get Borukhova to let go of Michelle’s 
legs. “You don’t touch me,” we hear Borukhova say, and say again, as if echoing 
Joseph’s words from a moment ago. Meanwhile, Borukhova still has her arms 
wrapped around her daughter’s red corduroy pants, locked tight at the knees, though 
apparently Malakov hasn’t noticed this. They continue to circle. Finally, Malakov 
realizes why mother and father have been locked into this peculiar dance. “Why are 
you holding her . . . ? Let go of her feet.” He pauses, now, as if at a loss. His insistent 
smile at last wavers. “Let the left side go,” he says. “Lift your arms, I’m holding her. 
Lift her other arm.” Eventually, Michelle is released from her mother’s grip. As 
father and daughter finally walk past the front gate toward an open doorway, the 
woman in the white shirt gazes toward the videographer. In a tired voice she says, 
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“Can you please shut off the camera?” “No,” we hear Borukhova sharply countermand. 
“Don’t shut it off.”
 What have the jurors and judge just witnessed? The images rush by quickly, and 
are quickly done. Yet, their brevity is belied by the depth of disturbance that they 
leave in their wake. There is an undercurrent here, a silent score to which couple and 
child have danced. In that silence viewers may discern the hidden presence of motive, 
its trace manifest in the irrational rage that keeps Borukhova locked in a custodial 
embrace, circling, unable to let her daughter go. There is something uncanny in this 
mother’s capacity for revenge. The task of judgment this jury faces consists not simply 
in the battle to come to grips with the human capacity for murder. Here they must 
also struggle to comprehend how a mother could deprive her only child of its father. 
There is something utterly incomprehensible, almost Medean, in such an inhuman 
act. One watches, and shudders, sensing what this dance of custody foretells. The 
violence is already there: the dozens of phone calls (ninety-one in all) between 
Borukhova and the cousin hired to kill have already been made, and the process of 
finalizing the details of the murder will continue, including the almost comical 
homemade silencer, made of a bleach bottle and duct tape, that blew off with the 
first shot, and remained behind after the event, lying uselessly inside the playground 
where the shooting occurred, though perhaps not entirely useless, for it bore the 
fingerprints that the shooter also carelessly left behind.
 When the local news media covered the Borukhova trial reporters took special 
interest in the custody video that played inside the courtroom, and how viewers 
responded. As one juror would later put it, “She was cold and unconcerned. She 
didn’t try to comfort her daughter . . . She just wanted to show on tape how upset the 
child was.”87 Needless to say, the figure who appeared in these images was not the 
demure, self-possessed physician that her attorney sought to portray at trial. There 
was something uncanny, almost monstrous, about what the video showed. It was 
apparent to those in the room who watched, and who saw the jurors as they too 
watched, with fixated gazes, many eyes brimming with tears, hands lifting to 
mouths, heads shaking ever so slightly from left to right and back again, as if in 
disbelief. A shudder coursed through the courtroom. Something uncanny was 
unfolding, and it made them shudder.
 A terrible presence lurks in that absence. The spectators in court watched, and as 
they watched they covered their mouths with their hands and shuddered, knowing 
that one of those dancers had already set in motion a plan to murder the other, had 
formed the intent, made the calls, as she circled around and around clutching the 
child whose loss brought her unbearable pain and incomprehensible rage. They dance 
and he smiles; he smiles and they dance: mother seeking to hold onto child, father 
seeking to release her from mother’s ironclad embrace. And accompanying that 
dance a silent score plays, the phantasmal presence of a mother’s revenge. We watch 
after the event, knowing what we know, and we shudder. It is a reality we cannot 
87. See Janet Malcolm, Iphigenia in Forest Hills: Anatomy of a Murder Trial, The New Yorker, May 3, 2010, 
at 34.
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grasp and so remains dancing beyond our reach. Yet, its uncanny presence leaves a 
trace, a strange presence that haunts the otherwise banal images that unfold within 
the sanctity of the courtroom. A sublime terror causes a shudder, but that is not all. 
It also demands a response.
 The experience of sublime horror is uncanny. It exceeds our comprehension. Yet, 
at the same time, it demands something of us. We cannot not respond, for once 
having become mindful of that which calls for a response, our response becomes an 
unshakable responsibility. Responding is the ethical itself. Emil Fackenheim calls 
this going beyond thought in the enactment of resistance before a sublime horror.88 
Emmanuel Levinas calls it going beyond being. That is what happens when we 
respond to the infinite need of the other who stands before us: “I exist through the 
other and for the other . . . I am inspired . . . [My responsibility] means an openness 
in which being’s essence is surpassed in inspiration.”89 In the grip of the ethical 
sublime, we enter a state of being-for-the-other. This is the ethically inspired state of 
ontological transport. We experience an uncanny, incomprehensible absence—
whether it is the inexpressible horror of inhuman rage or inhuman indifference. We 
experience it, and we shudder. It demands a response.
 The ethical originates in this inexpressible absence, this “ought” for which I am 
responsible. In this sense, justice, as human fraternity, is prior to freedom. We 
shudder, and know we must act. The ethical is an indictment as well as a sublime 
transport. It calls us into question even as it calls us beyond ourselves, in response to 
that which demands a response.
V. CONCLUSION: BETWEEN PURGATORY AND THE VISUAL SUBLIME
 With greater visual prudence comes more sophisticated visual discernment and, 
by extension, better judgment. Are we moved by sheer visual delight or by the 
sublime presence of an ontological excess that we experience as an ethical demand, 
an “ought” for which we are responsible? The virtue of the visual must be discerned 
with care. That is the province of visual jurisprudence. We find ourselves as if on a 
tightrope, balanced between the subjective virtuality of sensation and delight, on the 
one hand, and the external demand of the real, on the other. And we ask: By virtue 
of what kind of image is judgment warranted? We consume the mirror image and 
are, in turn, consumed by the echo of sensations that it produces. Likewise, the 
digital simulacrum that is generated by the mechanical image (the aniconic offspring 
of hidden algorithmic calculations) encloses the viewer within a parallel world that 
reflects the subject everywhere.90 Lacking any life of its own, it can only ramify the 
familiar world of the senses and the inherited, habitual cultural and cognitive forms 
that subjectively narrate their meaning. By contrast, the sublime image calls the 
88. Emile Fackenheim, To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought 
239–40 (1994).
89. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence 114–15 (Alphonso Lingis trans., 
1998) (1974).
90. See generally Sherwin, Visualizing Law, supra note 6.
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subject into question; it invites us into the world beyond ourselves. We meet reality 
midway between. And there is where the image’s worth ought to be tested. Subjective 
ownership of meaning, particularly when it seems warranted by the power of delight 
or amplified sensation, risks confusing that which is too close by, with that which is 
other. If the image does not indict the viewer, calling her into question, nothing 
other than the subject can be known. The aesthetic and ethical sublime converge on 
this point—on an otherness that takes us beyond ourselves. We may call this the 
auratic authority of the visual image.
 In this sense, we may say that Benjamin’s point concerning the loss of the aura in 
the mechanical reproduction of the image remains as valid today as when he last 
refined it in 1939. At the same time, however, he takes the insight too far. Benjamin 
was right to alert us to the sense of falsification, the ersatz experience that accompanies 
our consumption of the visual image as commodified simulacrum. This is the crux 
of baroque experience—seeing as if in a hall of mirrors, where the subject is endlessly 
ramified. In baroque experience we can never get outside ourselves. There is no place 
to stand to assess what is felt to be real. This is the sealed, yet endlessly fungible 
truth of baroque (including digital baroque) experience: the sense that truth is no 
more than an incessantly renewed tapestry of immanent totalities, each as immediate 
as it is transient.91 The real, by contrast, lies beyond the subject’s grasp (“like a body 
wholly body, f luttering its empty sleeves”92). It can never be totalized. Going towards 
the otherness of the real, meeting it at least half way, and self-reflexively assessing it 
there, constitutes the phenomenology and hermeneutic of visual jurisprudence, and 
of the visual meaning making process more generally.
 With no “Other” beyond the subject there is no space in which to assess the 
authenticity of visual experience. That is why, in the baroque maze of the virtual, 
“original” and “copy,” “fake” and “authentic,” lose their meaning. On the f lattened 
plane of baroque hyper-subjectivity, it is all the same. Measured by the exclusive 
benchmark of sensory efficacy, one algorithm is as good (real, true, right) as another. 
We need otherness to think otherwise. That is what it means to say that aesthetic 
and ethical responsibility begins with reality. While we may never fully attain it, 
reality unfolds in conjunction with the sublime. Simulated signs (algorithms 
included) are not typically suited to let reality be. (As Benjamin puts it, “There is no 
facsimile of the aura.”93) Simulations are images with no trace left of an original. Only 
the image that is at least to some extent capable of the sublime brings us toward the 
real, which is to say, lets something else appear.94 To allow oneself to experience an 
image in this way one must look and think with the image, beyond oneself. First one 
must allow a presence to emerge. Only after that encounter, if it occurs, may the 
work of critical interpretation meaningfully proceed. This is not the mimetic function 
91. See, e.g., Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence (Anne Boyman trans., 2001).
92. Stevens, supra note 69.
93. See Benjamin, supra note 2, at 260.
94. See Martin Heidegger, Parmenides 37 (Andrew Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz trans., 1992) (1982).
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of seeing as re-presentation (or mastery) but of “being-with”—what Heidegger 
describes as “being open to” what is other.95
 Only the simulacrum or simulated mirror-image may be encountered as a totality. 
The sublime image offers neither certainty nor totality. That is one of the hallmarks 
of its aesthetic and ethical authority. It is what Benjamin may have had in mind 
when he alluded at the outset of his famous essay to the “distance” of the aura. The 
aura, like being itself, remains inescapably elusive. Our experience of the sublime 
(otherness of being) consists precisely in the realization of absence in presence. It is 
this that makes us shudder. When the image collapses upon itself in totalized digital 
f latness, nothing is present enough to warrant the authority of being. The f lutter 
that we take as real is but the totality of a subjective or algorithmic phantasm, and 
the sensation it f leetingly warrants. Not all technologically reproduced images 
collapse into commodification, but it is incumbent upon the viewer to know when 
the image in view has done precisely that.
 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been deemed to express 
a preference for actuality. The excess of being, what I have referred to here as the 
presence of otherness, may elude full articulation, yet it remains worthy of law’s 
preferential treatment. That is why, when it comes to a defendant’s right to be present 
in court, and to confront the witnesses against him, only a compelling countervailing 
interest will suffice to warrant something less.96 A comparable preference for actuality 
should inform our treatment of visual images inside the courtroom. The law’s 
custodial responsibility for truth-based justice begins with reality, on screen and off. 
That is why it is incumbent upon everyone concerned with the continued legitimacy 
of law’s authority in the age of the digital baroque to seek the reality of the image, 
and to learn to repudiate its falsification.
 This, then, is the case for visual prudence in the law. We need to incorporate new 
visual benchmarks into the rhetoric of law in order to cope with the epistemological, 
ontological, and metaphysical quandaries that accompany law’s migration to the 
screen. When law lives as an image on the screen, it lives there as other images do, 
from the purgatory of the simulacrum to the presence of the aesthetic and ethical 
sublime. That is why it is incumbent upon us to understand the life of images in our 
time, and to adapt our rhetorical toolkit accordingly. Visual jurisprudence is the 
newly emerging field that sets out to assess the aesthetic and ethical implications of 
visualizing law in practice and in theory. Visual rhetoric must now become part and 
parcel of law’s aspirational claim to truth-based justice.
 We may condemn or perhaps even forget the aura when we diet only on f lattened, 
percussive images whose screen life consists in the momentary f lash of delight and 
sensation. But there are other images in the world that impart an entirely different 
kind of experience. These images resist immediate consumption to the extent that 
they embody some aspect of the real. We encounter that aspect when we go beyond 
95. Id. at 103.
96. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 1998) (“The demands of 
efficiency, and even necessity, do not create automatic exceptions to Constitutional requirements.”).
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ourselves and enter the otherness of the aesthetic and ethical sublime. Recognizing 
the range of experiential possibilities in the realm of the visual, and choosing a mode 
of discourse for the image that best suits it, has now become essential to law’s ongoing 
legitimation.
 It is against the backdrop of this newly developing rhetoric of visual experience 
that the epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical quandary of law now plays 
out. To make our way from the shadow land of visual purgatory to a place where we 
may see in a clearer light requires that we take very seriously indeed the demand for 
visual competence. That is the province of visual jurisprudence. The visual poetics 
presented here is but a beginning. There is much more work to be done to visually 
acquit the viewing subject of reality’s indictment by images.97 Are there technologically 
reproduced images that breathe in the air of the sublime? It may well be that in our 
time the fate of the aura and the fate of law have grown irrevocably entangled.
97. See, e.g., Law, Culture and Visual Studies (Anne Wagner & Richard K. Sherwin eds., 2013).
